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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research on birth order has consistently shown that later-borns have lower 
educational attainment than first-borns, however it is not known whether there are birth order 
patterns in college major. Given empirical evidence that parents disproportionately invest in 
first-born children, there are likely to be birth order patterns attributable to differences in both 
opportunities and preferences, related to ability, human capital specialization through parent-
child transfers of knowledge, and personality. Birth order patterns in college major 
specialization may shed light on these explanatory mechanisms, and may also account for 
long-term birth order differences in educational and labour market outcomes. Using Swedish 
population register data and sibling fixed effects we find large birth order differences in 
university applications. First-borns are more likely to apply to, and graduate from, medicine 
and engineering programs at university, while later-borns are more likely to study journalism 
and business programs, and to attend art school. We also find that these birth order patterns 
are stronger in high SES families, and that differences in college major explain approximately 
half of the within-family birth order differences in long-term earnings. These results indicate 
that early life experiences and parental investment shapes sibling differences in ability, 
preferences, and ambitions even within the shared environment of the family. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Life begins in the family. Parental socioeconomic background and investment, as well as 
genetic inheritance, plays an enormous role in shaping opportunity structures, and therefore 
the educational and socioeconomic trajectories that are followed in life. Siblings share fifty 
percent of one another’s genes, and they also typically live in the same home and grow up in 
the same neighbourhood. Despite these similar endowments, there is a great deal of variance 
in sibling outcomes (Björklund and Jäntti 2012). Part of this sibling divergence is attributable 
to different experiences within the family. While parents report that they treat their children 
very similarly, sibling reports, corroborated by independent observers, suggest that there are 
substantial differences (Reiss et al. 2009). One consistent marker of sibling differences within 
the family is birth order. Studies have shown that later-born siblings perform worse than first-
borns, and these differences are attributable to the social environment within the family rather 
than any biological differences between siblings (Kristensen and Bjerkedal 2007; Barclay 
2015a). Parental investment may be one of these social environment factors. For example, 
mothers are less likely to seek pre-natal care for later-borns than first-borns, and are also less 
likely to breastfeed later-borns (Buckles and Kolka 2014). In Sweden, parents take more 
parental leave for first-born children than later-borns (Sundström and Duvander 1999), and 
parents in the United States with two children have been found to spend up to 30 minutes 
more quality time per day with first-borns than with second-borns of the same age (Price 
2008).   
 
This evidence of differential treatment by birth order would suggest that variation in parental 
investment translates into measurable differences between siblings in the long run. Indeed, 
studies that have compared siblings within the same family have consistently shown that 
later-born siblings have a lower grade point average in school, a lower likelihood of making 
educational transitions, lower completed educational attainment, and a lower IQ (Black, 
Devereux, and Salvanes 2005; Kantarevic and Mechoulan 2006; Bjerkedal et al. 2007; 
Härkönen 2014; Barclay 2015a; Barclay 2015b; Rohrer, Egloff and Schmukle 2015). The 
clear and substantial birth order patterns identified by previous research are a consequence of 
inequitable resource distribution within the family (Hertwig, Davis, and Sulloway 2002). 
Disadvantage early in the life course has the potential to accumulate over time, leading to 
clear and measurable differences in socioeconomic and health outcomes later in life (Phillips 
and Shonkoff 2000). Beyond the family, cumulative advantage processes are a key dimension 
of the production of inequalities in society as a whole (Merton 1968; DiPrete and Eirich 2006 
Willson, Shuey, and Elder 2007), and a wealth of research has shown that it is not only 
absolute differences in access to resources that matters, but that relative differences are 
critical even when the absolute level of resource availability is high (Marmot 2004). Using the 
microcosm of the family to study these inequality generating processes provides an excellent 
opportunity to isolate the effect of relative advantage net of shared genetics, the shared 
contextual environment, and, furthermore, to do so from the very beginning of the lifecourse.  
 
Although the negative relationship between birth order and educational attainment has been 
observed consistently, the long-term advantages attributable to spending longer in the 
education system are not necessarily clear without a consideration of college major. College 
major has an important impact on future earnings, with those in the United States choosing 
natural science and business majors earning greater amounts, even after adjusting for 
individual ability (Arcidiacono 2004). In Norway, the earnings gap between the most and 
least lucrative college majors is roughly equivalent to the college wage premium (Kirkeboen,	Leuven,	 and	Mogstad	 2016). As will be reviewed in the following sections, past research 
suggests that college major is likely to vary by birth order, but this has not been tested 
empirically before. In this study we use a unique data resource to examine the relationship 
between birth order and college major, as well as college graduation data. With data on both 
applications and graduation we have information on initial preferences as well as the eventual 
pathway taken, the latter of which will be influenced by experience and academic 
performance within the tertiary education system. In addition to examining how the specific 
subject-major varies by birth order, we also examine whether first-borns are more likely to 
choose majors with higher expected earnings and higher occupational prestige, and whether 
later-borns are more likely to choose majors that carry greater risks in terms of future career 
progression, as measured by variance in expected earnings. Finally, we also examine the 
extent to which college major mediates long-term differences in earnings by birth order 
between siblings. 
 
Educational Choices  
 
The average difference in educational attainment between a first and a second-born sibling at 
age 30 in Sweden is approximately one third of a year, and between a first and a third-born 
sibling, a little less than half a year (Barclay 2015a). A number of theories have been 
proposed to explain why later-born children should do worse than their older siblings. Two 
theories that have attracted particular scientific attention are the resource dilution hypothesis 
(Blake 1981), and the confluence hypothesis (Zajonc 1976). While both theories state that 
later-born children should perform less well than their older siblings, the resource dilution 
hypothesis argues that relative to later-born children in the same family, earlier born children 
have a cumulative advantage in terms of access to finite parental resources, such as financial 
resources, but more particularly, quality time. The confluence hypothesis argues that earlier 
born children outperform their younger siblings because the average degree of intellectual 
stimulation within the household decreases as more infants enter the household, and that this 
intellectual stimulation is key for cognitive development. Both the resource dilution 
hypothesis and the confluence hypothesis predict greater cognitive ability for first-borns. In 
Western Europe and the United States there is a negative relationship between birth order and 
cognitive ability (Bjerkedal et al. 2007; Barclay 2015b; Rohrer et al. 2015), and that 
advantage suggests that earlier born siblings should have higher grades in high school and 
therefore should be more likely to be accepted to, and graduate from, STEM subjects than 
later-borns. If first-borns are more likely to study subjects at university that lead to 
advantageous career trajectories, this would serve to increase the divergence in the post-
university socioeconomic trajectories that first and later-borns tend to follow.  
 
However, net of cognitive ability, past work also suggests that later-borns are more likely to 
choose study pathways that are more risky and offer greater opportunities to express 
creativity. Such pathways may also be characterized by a greater payoff in the event of 
success. In Born to Rebel, Frank Sulloway (1996) argued that competition for parental 
investment amongst children causes siblings to adapt their behaviour and develop a 
personality that would allow them to occupy particular niches within the family. Following 
Adler (1928), Sulloway (1996) argued that first-borns and only children are likely to be more 
conservative due to the period of time when they were the only child within the home and 
where they were the sole focus of parental care. This, he argued, leads first-borns to identify 
with power and authority, and to become more conservative and socially dominant than their 
later-born siblings. Later-born children, finding that they are disadvantaged from the very 
beginning in terms of size and strength, are naturally more inclined to develop a personality 
that is questioning of authority. Furthermore, in the scramble for parental investment, later-
borns are forced to become more creative, original and follow risks in order to attract that 
investment. Applied to the question of how a college major is chosen, Sulloway’s work 
suggests that later-born siblings would be more likely to choose creative subjects at 
university, as well as university majors associated with greater variation in expected earnings. 
Furthermore, by virtue of identifying more closely with the parents, first-borns might have 
stronger preferences for following the same educational and occupational trajectory as them. 
 
While academic psychology journals are replete with studies on the relationship between birth 
order and personality, creativity, and risk-taking, relatively few of these studies have used the 
methodological gold standard for this avenue of research, which is the within-family sibling 
comparison. Studies that compare siblings across different families have been criticized on 
the grounds that the reported correlations are spurious due to confounding by unobserved 
factors that differ between families (Rodgers 2001a). The few studies on birth order and 
personality that have used a sibling comparison approach report that first-borns are more 
conscientious (Paulhus, Trapnell, and Chen 1999; Beer and Horn 2000, Healey and Ellis 
2007), and score higher on neuroticism (Cole 2013), while later-borns score higher on 
extraversion (Dixon et al. 2008), and openness to experience (Healey and Ellis 2007). Other 
studies using within-family designs have found that first-born siblings have higher 
educational aspirations than later-borns (Bu 2014). However, it should be noted that the 
samples used in these studies on birth order and personality are typically both small and non-
representative, and some studies using within-family comparisons have found no personality 
differences by birth order (Rohrer et al. 2015). Furthermore, although the application of 
Sulloway’s ideas to the selection of college major does have some face validity, on greater 
reflection it is not clear that we should assume that creativity and college major are 
necessarily closely aligned, as all subjects offer opportunities to innovate in some way.  
 Studies investigating the relationship between personality and vocational choices show that 
individuals tend to choose occupations that match their personality, and that they are more 
satisfied, and achieve more, when they do so (Holland 1996). A positive match is 
characterized by a correspondence between the skills and temperament of an individual, and 
the demands of the occupational environment (Holland 1985). This approach has also been 
extended to the choice of college major, finding that a positive match between personality and 
college major is linked to greater achievement, and lower dropout rates (Allen and Robbins 
2008). Although there is some variation, studies on the relationship between the Big Five 
personality traits and college major tend to yield relatively consistent results. Those who 
study natural sciences and applied sciences, such as engineering, score higher on 
conscientiousness and lower on openness to experience than humanities, arts, and social 
science majors (Kline and Lapham 1992, Van der Molen, Schmidt, and Kruisman 2007). 
Social science majors demonstrate higher scores on extraversion than humanities or natural 
science majors, but lower scores on extraversion than business or arts majors (Corulla and 
Coghill 1991; Harris 1993; De Fruyt and Mervielde 1996), while medical students also score 
high on extraversion (Lievens et al. 2002). Although each of these studies were based on a 
sample of college students who had already decided upon a major, which allows for the 
possibility that personality is influenced by the experience of studying a certain major, similar 
results for the relationship between the Big Five traits and preference for college major were 
found amongst high school students planning to apply to university (Balsamo, Lauriola, and 
Saggino 2012).  
 
Overall, research on the relationship between birth order and personality, and personality and 
college major (Balsamo et al. 2012), suggests that first-borns should be more likely than later-
borns to study natural and applied sciences, while later-borns should be more likely to study 
arts, business, and social sciences, and medicine: Studies demonstrating that first-borns have 
greater cognitive ability and better grades in high school than later-born siblings (Bjerkedal et 
al. 2007; Barclay 2015b) would suggest that first-borns would be more likely to be accepted 
to study natural and applied sciences, though this approach would predict that first-borns 
would be more likely to study medicine than later-borns. Research indicating that first-borns 
are more ambitious than later-born siblings (Bu 2014), suggests that first-borns might be more 
likely to apply to college majors that lead to professional careers. Theories predicting that 
first-borns should be more conservative (Adler 1928; Sulloway 1996) also suggest that first-
borns may be more likely to apply to majors that are linked to a stable professional career, 
such as medicine, or law, and majors associated with lower potential volatility in future 
earnings. Given Sulloway’s (1996) predictions concerning the degree to which first-borns are 
likely to identify with parents relative to later-borns, we also examine whether first-borns are 
more likely to choose the same degree and field of study that their parents pursued. 
 
Human Capital and Occupational Specialization  
 
Although most theories concerning how a first-born advantage emerges imply that this 
advantage transpires unintentionally, parenting strategies may also be consciously, or 
subconsciously, biased towards the first-born. One reason for this is a cultural legacy of 
primogeniture, where undivided bequests were given to the first-born son in many societies. 
While legal primogeniture is obsolete in modern European societies, vestiges of this cultural 
practice may linger in contemporary parental behavior. Assuming such a parental strategy 
existed, it would be most rational to invest in the child best endowed in terms of skills and 
abilities. A recent study using US data shows that high SES parents target investment in the 
highest achieving child, though this is less true for low SES parents (Grätz and Torche 2016). 
Given previous literature showing how first-borns tend to be the best-endowed children, a 
parental investment strategy that focuses on one child will exacerbate the advantages for first-
borns. Another motive that has been suggested for primogeniture is that parents may favor the 
first-born because they have a larger generational overlap with them (Silles 2010). This 
greater overlap means that parents can help and monitor the career of the first-born, and also 
have a chance to reap the benefits of that investment before they die.  
 
Parents not only invest time and money into their children, but also transfer specific skills. 
There is a strong tendency for children to take up the same occupations as their parents, which 
explains social reproduction (Jonsson et al. 2009). One reason for this is that they may have a 
comparative advantage in those occupations in terms of occupation specific skills as a result 
of absorbing information and knowledge from the parents about their occupations as they 
grow up (Laband and Lentz 1983). Although we know little of birth order effects on such 
specialization, we could expect a link if the parents favour the first-born. First, the cumulative 
advantage in academic skills that first-borns may already have makes them a target for 
investments in such occupation specific skills. Second, generational overlap may make it 
easier to help the first-born and for them to reap the benefits of such help. Third, if investment 
in skills is more productive the younger a child is (Heckman 2000), the first-born will have an 
absolute advantage over his or her siblings since only they were able to get undivided parental 
attention at the youngest ages.  
 
Contextual Factors:  Swedish Educational System 
 
Education in Sweden is state funded at all levels, and tertiary education is free for Swedish 
citizens (Halldén 2008; Högskoleverket 2012). In Sweden family resources are therefore less 
important for the transition to tertiary education than in other contexts, such as the United 
States. The Swedish education system is divided into three sections: (1) 9 years of 
compulsory schooling (grundskolan); (2) three additional years of secondary school 
(gymnasium); and, (3) the tertiary section (Halldén, 2008). Tertiary education in Sweden 
today consists of two parts. The first is a traditional university education, with degrees at the 
Bachelors (kandidatexamen), Magister (magisterexamen), Masters, Licentiate, and Doctoral 
levels. The second part is a vocational tertiary education (Högre yrkesutbildning/Högskolor) 
(Halldén 2008). Students in tertiary education are eligible for financial support from the 
Swedish state for living costs in the form of study grants and student loans with low interest 
rates (Högskoleverket 2012), minimising the need for reliance on family resources for 
maintenance. In 2012 approximately 33% of the Swedish population had undergone post-
secondary education, which was slightly higher than the OECD average (Högskoleverket 
2012). 
 
 
DATA  
 
In this paper we use Swedish administrative register data to address birth order effects on 
educational choices. To study the influence of birth order we link children and parents via the 
multigenerational register (Statistics Sweden, 2010), which holds information on parents for 
individuals born in 1932 and later. Using information on birth year and month, and parents’ 
identity, we construct birth order. We define a sibling group as a set of individuals that share a 
biological mother and a father. The multigenerational register also allows us to match other 
parental characteristics such as mother’s age at the time of birth of the individual, as well as 
the socio-economic characteristics of the parents.  
 
Tertiary Choice Data – Applications and Graduations	
 
For the educational choice, we use a unique data source that contains individuals’ applications 
for university in Sweden, where all admission to university is centralized. With the central 
‘applicants and admission register’, we have complete information on all aspects of the 
choice, i.e., the programs included and their rank within the individual application, and 
whether the applicant was admitted. A program is a predetermined line of study that will lead 
to a degree in a specific area, if successful. This is very different from the US system, for 
example, where liberal arts BA degrees cover a much broader range of subjects. Not all 
tertiary studies are organized as programs; one can instead choose to study specific courses, 
which lasts for one semester, and which can be combined into a degree (under some formal 
rules). Most areas allow both modes of study, but professional degrees (e.g., to become a 
physician) are limited to program study. While we also have access to course applications in 
the ‘applicants and admission register’, it is less clear what degree these individual course 
studies will eventually lead to. We have thus concentrated on program applications, even 
though this creates a selection of the more dedicated or focused students. Since we will miss 
out the least ambitious choices, which is more likely to happen for later-borns according to 
our expectations, our estimates will therefore tend to be conservative.  
 
For the analyses of programs, we analyze cohorts born between 1982 and 1990, resulting in 
an effective sample size of 146,107 (see Tables A3 and A4). All families where at least two 
siblings have applied to a university program are included in our analysis. The application 
data exists for the years 2001-2012, which means that every cohort has at least three years 
where we can observe any application (assuming graduation from upper-secondary school at 
age 19). Since one can re-apply infinite times, we construct two choice variables: (a) the 
highest ranked program in the first of the applications we can observe, and (b) the last 
observed program among those programs the applicant got admitted to. The first is likely to 
capture more pure (and perhaps less informed) preferences, whereas the second captures both 
learning because of tertiary studies and adjustment to one’s realistic chances, as well as a 
tighter link to what education the individual is likely to end up pursuing. In this sense, these 
variables are the endpoints of a continuum of possible ways to measure choice. We then 
record the program as coded to the nomenclature SUN2000 (The Swedish version of the 
international ISCED-97, Statistics Sweden, 2000) and code this to an aggregate classification 
with 17 categories, as shown in Table A3. This coding first places similar educations in terms 
of field of study in the same category, but also sorts educations by length, prestige and 
admission requirements. For example, the scheme separates between short and long teaching 
programs, which captures differences between, for example, pre-school and upper-secondary 
school teachers, and short and long engineering programs. Long engineering refers to 
‘civilingenjör’ (Master in engineering), which is 4.5 years of study with a theoretical focus 
and which is preparatory for research, while short engineering refer to  'högskoleingenjör’, 
(i.e., bachelor of science of engineering), which is 3 years of study and features less 
mathematics and a more practical focus in the curriculum 
 
Based on the education code in SUN2000, we can also match the program to conditions of 
graduates in the labor market. We use this to compute expected outcomes, that is, those 
conditions that the pursuit of the program on average will lead to historically. This is 
important in order to grasp the consequences of a specific choice in terms of measurable 
inequality. Here we measure expected mean level of full-time earnings1, the variance of 
expected earnings2, expected occupational prestige3 and a measure of the expected level of 
non-employment4. The expected earnings variance and expected level of non-employment are 
intended to measure educational risk.  We base the expected outcomes on the actual labour 
market performance of individuals’ aged 30-32 in the years 2009-2012, and for the earnings 
measures we control for gender, immigration, birth year and the presence of children in the 
household. 
 
In order to test parent-child transfer of education specific preferences, we construct measures 
for whether the educational choice matches with any of parents’ field of education (using data 
from the population wide education register). The SUN2000 separates between level and 
field, the former contains 3 digits, and the latter 3 digits and also a letter. We construct a 
measure of matching degree, in which both level and field should match on 3 digits, and two 
measures of matching fields on 3 and 2 digit levels. We use annual data on parents’ education 
from 1990 to 2012 in order to record any match (this will also capture if parents themselves 
upgrade their education).  
 
This data is also linked to school registers containing previous school grades, and one control 
variable will be the grade point average (GPA) from upper-secondary school (transformed to 																																																								
1 Earnings data comes from population level tax records. We truncate the annual earnings to above SEK 120,000 
in 2003 prices, i.e., more than 10,000 SEK per month (or some USD 1400 or GBP 833 per month, assuming 
typical exchange rates of 7 SEK per USD and 12 SEK per GBP) to capture full time earnings. Due to wide 
ranging collective bargaining with minimum wages, individuals’ earnings this low do not have employment for 
the full year.  
2 The earnings risk per SUN code is calculated as 𝑅 = !!!! ! 𝑛 following Berkhout, Hartog et al. 2010, Eq 
7.). This is similar to the coefficient of variation, i.e., variance relative to average level of earnings. We use full 
earnings distribution here (in log form with the addition of a small constant to include zeroes) in order to capture 
variations related to under- and unemployment.  
3 This data is based on the population level occupation register (Statistics Sweden 2004), where occupations are 
coded to 3-digit ISCO-88(com). We have matched the ISCO codes to the Treiman scale (SIOPS, see Treiman 
1977) using keys provided by Ganzeboom (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). 
4 Given the fixed wage structure discussed in footnote 1, we compute non-employment as annual earnings below 
120,000. This measure captures the proportion of non-employed for each degree.  
z-scores). Given that previous research has shown that first- and earlier-born siblings have 
higher cognitive ability scores than later-born siblings, we want to examine the extent to 
which choice of college major by birth order is contingent upon differences in ability. 
Although GPA does not perfectly capture cognitive ability, it does capture general academic 
ability and performance, which is arguably more important for continued academic progress 
to university and choice of college major than an abstracted measure of cognitive ability. 
 
One caveat with the choice data is that applications for some specific high prestige art schools 
are missing (they control their own admission based on tests rather than grades and are 
therefore absent from the central administration system). We can however capture art school 
students in graduation data, and create a graduation dataset for the birth cohorts 1960-1987. 
This dataset is identical to the application data as outlined above, except that information on 
GPA is missing, and that we also capture degrees taken as courses, not only as programs.  
 
We also use the 1960-1987 birth cohorts to examine the extent to which college major 
mediates birth order differences in earnings in adulthood. We use data from employers to 
measure monthly wages at age 30, standardized to reflect fulltime employment and adjusted 
for inflation. The latest point for which we have data is 2012, and so for those aged less than 
30 in 2012 (i.e. cohorts 1983-1987), we measure earnings as close to 30 as possible, and also 
adjust for age at measurement in our analyses. The wage data (Statistics Sweden 2013) has 
only partial coverage in the private sector for firms with less than 500 employees, where a 
sample is used. In these cases, we first search across years to find valid records, and if this is 
unsuccessful, we impute the missing based on wages regressed on annual earnings and 
detailed education codes. By searching across years, we find most individuals, and only 
impute wages for 11 percent of the analytical sample. The correlation between wage 
predictions and actual wages is .76. We also adjust for the imputation with a dummy variable 
in our analyses.			
 
Generic Coding  
 
Because we use family fixed effects, information on parents’ characteristics become 
redundant, even though the data are very rich in such measures. In order to assess effect 
heterogeneity due to social standing, we code social class origin using the EGP on the basis of 
censuses (1980, 1985 and 1990; EGP is coded on the basic of occupation codes), and divide 
individuals into a high and low class (leaving children of farmers and entrepreneurs out of this 
comparison). For this educational choice data the size of the EGP I class is very big (simply 
because the service class is over-represented in further education and the data is conditional 
on an application for university). Table A5 shows the probability of being included in the 
analytical sample by social class in the family of origin and family size. As a result we 
separate between EGP I and EGP II, III, VI and VII. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
For the study of educational choice, one would ideally analyse the aggregated choice scheme 
with a multinomial logit model. It is however essential for birth order effects to be established 
within the family (Rodgers 2001b), which the standard multinomial model disallows. We 
have attempted an estimator which implements fixed effects into the multinomial model, but 
without success as the likelihood function will not converge.5 We therefore give priority to 
																																																								
5 The femlogit estimator in stata, see Pforr (2014) and Chamberlain (1980).  
the fixed effects, and use a more crude estimator in the form of independent linear probability 
models (LPM), where each program is coded as a separate 0/1 outcome.  
 
We thus use linear fixed effects models for all outcomes, including both binary and 
continuous outcomes. We prefer LPM over non-linear models such as the logit specification, 
because only the former allows direct comparisons of coefficients across models and groups 
(Mood 2010), and that is a specific aim of our study. Average marginal effects from logit 
models are comparable, but are then close to identical to unstandardized coefficients from 
LPM, so little is won (see also Angrist and Pischke 2009:103-107). The LPM is a consistent 
estimator even for binary outcomes (Angrist and Pischke 2009:47,51), our data is very large, 
and with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, the often cited inference problem due to 
heteroskedastic residuals in the LPM is mitigated. In all models, we use cluster-robust 
standard errors using the shared sibling group ID as the cluster group. Stock and Watson 
(2008) showed that simple heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are inconsistent in fixed 
effect models, which is what we use, but that cluster-robust standard errors work with these 
models, and  are also robust for heteroskedasticity (Stock and Watson 2008). 
 
All model specifications include a control for mother’s age at birth (one year dummies) and 
the individuals’ birth year (also one year dummies).6 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
College Major 																																																								
6 Although maternal age and year of birth are very high correlated within each family, our results for birth order 
are consistent either with both variables included in the models, or without the inclusion of one or the other 
variable. 
 The results for applications to a specific college major can be seen in Table 1, based on 
within-family sibling comparison models. Table 1 shows the probability of applying to each 
of the college majors, with, and without, adjusting for high school GPA. Note that the 
numbers of fifth- and sixth-order siblings are small, even in this population data. As can be 
seen, later-born siblings are more likely to apply to teacher programs, art programs, business 
programs, journalism programs, and short-health programs that provide training for nurses. 
First-borns are more likely than later-borns to apply to law programs, life sciences programs, 
the more prestigious long engineering programs, as well as health-related professional 
programs that provide medical training. For the most part these results are not conditional on 
academic ability, though when we adjust for GPA, the birth order differences in applications 
to teacher programs largely disappear. Interestingly, most of these differences in application 
probabilities by birth order increase, or decrease, monotonically by birth order, and it is not a 
simple distinction between first-borns and all other later-born siblings.  
 
 
*** Table 1 Approximately Here *** 
 
 
In general, the estimated coefficients show that the differences by birth order are large and 
substantial, particularly when considered in light of the baseline probability of applying to 
these programs (see mean of the outcome in the bottom row of Table 1). Figure 1 illustrates 
these differences for selected programs based on the results from Tables 1 and 3. We cap the 
y-scale at a relative probability of 150% to maintain readability. For example, second-borns 
are 2.0 percentage points less likely to apply to medical training programs than first-borns, 
and fifth-borns are 5.8 percentage point less likely. Given that the baseline probability of 
applying to medical training programs is 7.4%, this is a 27% difference in relative terms 
between the first and second-borns, and a 78% difference between first and fifth-borns. The 
difference between first and third-borns is approximately equivalent to the gender difference 
in applying to medical programs that is estimated in Table 1, and equivalent to 75% of one 
standard deviation in high school GPA according to the estimate for GPA in the model for 
applying to medical training programs, which is a very substantial difference. In relative 
terms second-borns and third-borns are respectively 11% and 16% more likely to apply to 
business programs than first-borns. Furthermore, in relative terms, second-borns are 16% 
more likely than first-borns to apply to journalism programs, while third-borns and fourth-
borns are respectively 40% and 60% more likely to do so.  
 
 
*** Figure 1 Approximately Here *** 
 
 
The results in Table 2 are based upon the proportion of our sample that was admitted to 
university, and focuses on the last program that these applicants were admitted to. 
Approximately 37% of university applicants in our sample got admitted to a program other 
than their first choice. Here we see that there are some differences in the birth order patterns. 
After adjusting for GPA, later-borns remain significantly more likely to apply for business 
programs, and significantly less likely to apply for engineering and medical programs, but are 
now also more likely to apply for social and behavioural science programs. Furthermore, they 
are no longer significantly more likely to apply to journalism programs, and the strength of 
the birth order patterns are somewhat attenuated overall. The difference between the patterns 
for the first application to university, and the final program to which they are admitted are 
likely to reflect some kind of a learning process within the family between the first and last 
application, whereby first-borns, parents, and later-borns revise their expectations in response 
the first round of university admission decisions.  
 
 
*** Table 2 Approximately Here *** 
 
 
The results in Table 3 show the results for first choice applications to specific college majors 
where we stratify our analyses by the social class of origin of the applicants and control for 
GPA. The results without controlling for GPA are shown in the Appendix in Table A6. We 
choose to focus on university applications from individuals in the upper and lower ends of the 
EGP class scheme so as to highlight any social class differences in university applications by 
birth order. As Table 3 shows, the effects that we described in Table 1 are largely 
concentrated amongst those from a high EGP background. For individuals from low EGP 
backgrounds, the only birth order effects that persist are the lower probabilities for later-borns 
of applying to long engineering and professional health related programs that provide medical 
training, and the higher probability of applying to business programs. Amongst individuals 
from high EGP backgrounds, we see that later-borns are more likely to apply to arts, 
journalism, business, and short health programs, and first-borns are more likely to apply to 
long engineering, life sciences, and professional health related programs. Furthermore, the 
size of the estimated coefficients for the differences by birth order are similar to those 
estimated across applicants from all social class backgrounds shown in Table 1 after 
controlling for GPA.  
  
*** Table 3 Approximately Here *** 
 
 
Although our results show that later-borns are significantly more likely to apply to art 
programs, prestigious private art schools in Sweden have a separate admission process, and 
applications to those colleges are not captured in the application data that we have used thus 
far. However, we can capture these differences by examining birth order differences in 
graduation from an art school or with an art degree from earlier birth cohorts, born 1960-
1987. The results, shown in Table A7 in the appendices, show that the results from the 
analyses presented above in Tables 1-3 do provide an accurate portrayal of birth order 
differences in proclivity towards the creative arts. Considering the average rate of of art 
school degrees of 0.009 (0.9 percent), third-borns are 33% more likely than first-borns to 
graduate from an art school. Within the wider definition of art degrees more generally, 
including art degrees from non-specialized schools, the gradient is even stronger in relative 
terms. As with our previous analyses of the choice data, we also find that the birth order 
gradient is clear amongst siblings from high social class families, but there are no meaningful 
differences by birth order amongst siblings from low social class families. 
 
Table 4 shows the estimates from models that examine how choice differences are associated 
with later inequality. In other words, we examine whether there are birth order differences in 
applications and admission to programs that have, for example, greater expected earnings 
potential, or are expected to lead to different levels of occupational prestige. As Table 4 
shows, the choice differences are associated with later inequality by birth order. Relative to 
first-borns, the expected earnings of second-borns, based on the college programs that they 
apply to, are 2.3% lower, and are 3.1% lower for third-borns. After adjusting for high school 
GPA, measured at age 16, we see that the pattern persists, but the estimated coefficients are 
slightly smaller: relative to first-borns, the expected earnings of second-borns are 1.7% lower, 
and are 2.2% lower for third-borns. Table 4 also shows the estimates from models that 
examine expected earnings risk (variation) by birth order. We find neither substantial nor 
significant birth order effects amongst first choice applications. Table 4 shows that later-born 
siblings also choose college majors that are expected to lead to lower occupational prestige 
than first-borns, and this pattern also persists and is statistically significant after adjusting for 
high school GPA. To make a comparison between the estimates for birth order and high 
school GPA on expected occupational prestige, the difference between a first and a second-
born is equivalent to 32% of one standard deviation of high school GPA, and the difference 
between a first and a third-born is equivalent to 45% of one standard deviation. Later-borns 
siblings are also more likely than first-borns to apply to college majors that have a higher risk 
of unemployment. The results are generally very similar for the last program to which 
applicants are admitted. 
 
 
*** Table 4 Approximately Here *** 
 
 
Table 5 repeats the analyses presented in Table 4, but focuses on first choice applications and 
stratifies by social class. In a similar pattern to the results seen in Table 3, we find that the 
birth order effects are largely concentrated amongst those from a high EGP social class 
background, while birth order effects are weaker amongst siblings from families with a low 
EGP social class. Amongst siblings from a high socioeconomic status background, first-borns 
are substantially more likely to apply to college majors that have higher expected earnings. 
The same applies to siblings from a low SES background, but the differences are smaller. 
Models examining earnings risk again show no birth order pattern. In terms of occupational 
prestige, birth order effects are much stronger amongst siblings from high SES families. 
Amongst siblings from low SES families, there are only small differences in expected 
occupational prestige by birth order after controlling for GPA. Finally, we find that there are 
birth order differences in the expected likelihood of unemployment in terms of the college 
majors that siblings apply to in high SES families, but not in low SES families.  
 
 
*** Table 5 Approximately Here *** 
 
 
Table 6 shows the results from analyses examining birth order effects on human capital 
specialization.  For the first choices made in university applications, it can be seen that later-
borns are slightly less likely to follow in their parents’ footsteps, but this pattern is very weak 
and is not statistically significant. This is true for both the first choice tertiary program, as 
well as the last program to which they were admitted. Although the point estimates suggest 
that later-borns are slightly less likely to apply or be admitted to the same program as their 
parents, almost none of these differences are statistically significant after controlling for GPA. 
We also examine whether the choice of the same degree or the field as the parents varies by 
social class of origin, and those results are shown in the appendices in Table A8. Those results 
show that in high social class family’s first-borns are slightly more likely to choose the same 
degree or field of the parents, but that controlling for GPA heavily attenuates even these small 
differences. There are essentially no differences by birth order amongst siblings from low 
social class families.  
 
 
*** Table 6 Approximately Here *** 
 
 
Although the findings presented above indicate that there are clear birth order differences in 
preferences, admission, and graduation by college major, the extent to which these differences 
mediate long-term birth order differences in earnings remains unclear. Table 7 shows the 
results from models examining birth order differences in log earnings around age 30 for 
cohorts born 1960-1987, and how field of study mediates these differences, as measured by 
our 17 category field variable. Column 1 of Table 7 shows that second-borns have earnings 
2.3% lower than first-borns at age 30, while third- to fifth-borns have earnings that are 
approximately 3.6% lower than first-borns. These differences are even greater amongst 
individuals from low social class backgrounds. Adjusting for field of study, shown in column 
2 of Table 7, reduces these birth order differences substantially, by around 50-60% in the 
pooled sample and high social class families, and by around 30-40% in low social class 
families. We also estimate these models controlling for field of study to a very high degree of 
specificity, and those results, shown in Table A9, are very similar to those shown in Table 7. 
 
 
*** Table 7 Approximately Here *** 
 
 
A consistent finding in this study is that birth order effects are stronger amongst siblings from 
high SES backgrounds. However, as Table A5 shows, siblings from lower SES backgrounds 
are, relative to the population, underrepresented amongst university applicants and attendees. 
It is therefore possible that the weak birth order effects that we observe in lower SES families 
are non-representative of general birth order effects in low SES families. However, we have 
also run additional analyses, shown in Table A10, that indicate that birth order effects are 
substantially weaker in low SES than in high SES families even when looking at long-term 
earnings and occupational attainment in the entire population, where selection into the sample 
does not play the same role. 
 
We have also conducted several other sensitivity checks, summarised in Table A11. One of 
these relates to differences in the birth order pattern across sibling group sizes. Although we 
have operationalised birth order as a categorical variable, our analyses pool across family 
sizes, and might therefore obscure a birth order pattern where the key distinctions relate to 
first-, middle-, and last-born differences. To evaluate this possibility we have estimated 
additional models for all the analyses shown above stratified by family size. Those results are 
consistent with the patterns that we have presented above, and are available upon request. 
Given that Table A5 shows that the probability of being included in our analyses varies very 
little by family size, and previous research has shown that family size has little if any causal 
effect on final educational attainment in the Nordic region (e.g. Black, Devereux and Salvanes 
2005), we feel that it is relatively unlikely that sibling group size moderates our results. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Although previous studies have shown that first-borns spend longer in the educational system, 
no previous research has examined whether there are horizontal differences in educational 
pathways by birth order. This study has shown that when comparing siblings within the same 
family, first-borns are more likely to study more prestigious college majors, college majors 
with greater expected earnings, and college majors associated with greater expected 
occupational prestige. What’s more, those differences persist net of previous academic 
performance, as measured by high school GPA, and they explain a substantial proportion of 
the birth order differences in long-term earnings between siblings. It is important to note that 
the Swedish education system provides free tertiary education, so it is not that later-borns are 
unable to pursue medical training due to, for example, the draining of family financial 
resources available for education. Given the setting that our data is drawn from, we expect 
that these results could be even more pronounced in a context such as the United States where 
tuition fees are high. High tuition fees might reduce the opportunities for later-borns to attend 
college more generally, and to pursue expensive graduate degrees, such as medicine, more 
particularly.  
 
We also found clear differences in the birth order patterns by socioeconomic status, as the 
effects were substantially stronger amongst siblings from high SES families than amongst 
siblings from low SES families. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive.	One potential 
explanation for our findings is that parents in the highest SES families, at least in the US, 
reinforce advantage to a greater extent for high ability children than lower ability children 
through additional investment and cognitive stimulation (Grätz and Torche 2016). First-borns 
have exclusive access to parent investment and attention when they are born. This gives them 
an early headstart, and due to the compound interest that accrues to early advances in 
language and cognitive development (Stanovich 1986; Sénéchal and LeFevre 2002; Heckman 
2006), they are more likely to be seen as having high ability when they are children, which 
parents will then reinforce further. Empirical research from the United States using time-use 
data suggests that over the ages 4-13 in two-child families in the United States, a first-born 
will have approximately 2,230 more hours of quality time with parents than a second-born 
will (Price 2008). Such variation, estimated as a 40% difference, is likely to be very difficult 
for a second-born to catch up on. In general, high socioeconomic status parents have been 
found to spend more quality-time with their children than low socioeconomic status parents 
(Guryan, Hurst and Kearney 2008). A Matthew effect where gains accrue faster to those who 
already have much could explain the SES differences in social class attainment and 
occupational prestige by birth order.  
 
Although these early life advantages are likely to have a positive effect on academic 
achievement, we find that grades in high school do not fully mediate the relationship between 
birth order and applications to arts, engineering, medicine, journalism, or business programs. 
Recent research using a within-family comparison design has reported that first-borns have 
greater educational aspirations than later-born siblings (Bu 2014). If first-borns are more 
ambitious than later-borns, this could contribute to the explanation for why they tend to apply 
to college majors with greater expected earnings, and college majors that lead to professional 
careers. This greater ambition could also explain why birth order effects are generally 
stronger for first choice applications than they are for the last admitted program, as first-borns 
might overestimate their abilities, or have parents who overestimate their abilities. This higher 
level of ambition might be a consequence of greater parental investment and support, which 
might be particularly true in high SES families (Grätz and Torche 2016). Parents and later-
born siblings are also likely to learn from observing the first application of the first-born, and 
adjust their own expectations accordingly, leading birth order effects to be weaker for the last 
admitted program. 
 
Another explanation for the SES differences in college major applications may be related to 
the insurance function of private socioeconomic resources (Pfeffer and Hällsten 2012), where 
those from more privileged backgrounds feel that they are better able to take risks because 
they have a private safety net. Individuals raised in low SES families may feel less 
comfortable about pursuing subjects such as journalism, or art, as a university education for 
many low SES individuals is a potential ticket for upwards social mobility. This may be why 
we observe that the birth order differences in pursuing engineering, or medicine, are clear in 
both high and low SES families, while birth order differences in studying journalism and 
graduating with art degrees are only clear amongst siblings from high SES families. 
Alternatively, this variation could be explained by differences in culture by social class of 
origin. Parents in low SES families may see clear value in pursuing traditional, and more 
vocational, subjects such as engineering or medicine, but might be far more critical of their 
children if they suggested that they would pursue less traditional university programs, and 
there is empirical evidence for such sorting in the United States (Goyette and Mullen 2006).  
 
The results from our analyses of the likelihood of studying the same subject as the parents by 
birth order relate to Sulloway’s sibling niche differentiation model as well theories about 
human capital specialization. We found only limited evidence that first-borns are more likely 
than later-borns to end up pursuing the same university degree as their parents, though there 
was slightly greater support for this pattern in high social class families than in low social 
class families. This pattern of results is inconsistent with Sulloway’s assertion that birth order 
affects the degree of alignment with parents, as his sibling niche differentiation model would 
suggest that first-borns from families of all social classes would be more likely to follow the 
parents than later-borns.  
 
While this study has many strengths, there are some limitations. Although the use of siblings 
fixed effects adjusts for all shared time-invariant factors within the family, and reduces 
residual confounding to a great degree, not all factors that vary between siblings are adjusted 
for. To a certain extent, of course, that is a crucial part of our assumption about the way that 
birth order shapes the experience within the family, but some factors such as parental income 
may change over time, and have a different impact on parental investment on children at 
different ages. Although we do not control for changes to parental income or occupation over 
time, other studies that have controlled for time-varying parental income and social class have 
found that these controls make very little difference to within-family estimates for birth order 
(Barclay and Myrskylä 2016). Our analysis may also have been limited by the unavailability 
of other variables. For example, the specific registers that we have access to do not contain 
information on birth weight. Previous studies have shown that first-borns have lower birth 
weight than later-borns (Magnus, Berg, and Bjerkedal 1985), and that birth weight is 
positively related to cognitive ability, educational attainment, and earnings (Black, Devereux, 
and Salvanes 2007). However, it can be argued that a lower birth weight is a consequence of 
birth order rather than a confounder variable, and that it is not therefore necessarily to adjust 
for it to identify the causal effect of birth order on later life outcomes. Either way, the lack of 
control for birth weight means that we are probably obtaining a conservative estimate of birth 
order on the later life outcomes that we address in this study. Furthermore, it was not possible 
for us to test whether personality factors mediated the relationship between birth order and 
educational choices as we did not have any information on personality available for the birth 
cohorts that we study. Neither did we have information on a direct measure of IQ. However, 
we were able to adjust for ability in the form of high school grades, which is more relevant to 
our study as it is a direct measure of academic ability, and grades also shape opportunity 
structures for future academic progression.  
Although this study has been focused on within-family differences in educational trajectories 
by birth order, our results may also provide insights into the production of inequalities across 
different families. Previous studies have shown that variation in school quality accounts for 
relatively little variation in academic performance (Coleman et al. 1966), and that most 
socioeconomic differences in performance are produced within the family, beginning well 
before first school attendance. Furthermore, recent research on the technology of skills 
formation has shown that the marginal returns to investment in children diminish rapidly with 
increasing age (Heckman 2006; Knudsen et al 2006). Previous research has shown that 
parental socioeconomic status is associated with different time investments in children 
(Guryan, Hurst and Kearney 2008), as well as substantial differences in the degree to which 
children are encouraged to learn and develop through exposure to vocabulary, books, and 
other interactive stimuli (Mol and Bus 2011; Cartmill et al. 2013; Weisleder and Fernald 
2013). If birth order can be seen as a proxy for time spent with the parents, and particularly so 
during the very first years of life, then our results suggest that parent-child relations and 
parental exposure for the child have very far reaching consequences, in line with, for 
example, Coleman’s (1988) arguments for social capital effects. This implies that the 
documented variation in time spent with children by parental socioeconomic status (Guryan, 
Hurst and Kearney 2008) is even more consequential than previously realized. Our results 
indicate that greater parental exposure leads to more ambitious choices and better labor 
market outcomes. Furthermore, the differences in parental exposure, as well as the timing of 
parental investments indicate why it is so difficult for second and later-born siblings to catch 
up on the first-born, as they never have exclusive access to the same level of resources. 
Between-family socioeconomic differences in parental exposure and investment dwarf 
within-family differences in parental exposure and investment by birth order. Given that the 
relatively small differences that we observe within-families produce such substantial 
differences, we can speculate that the mechanisms underlying birth order effects may also 
play an important role in the production of inequality across families. 
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 Figure 1. Relative probabilities of choosing a selected set of programs in first choice, for entire sample and by social class.  
Note: the data points show the relative probability of applying to each program based upon estimated birth order differences as well as the baseline probability of 
applying to any of these programs. Data points that are hollow indicate no statistically significant differences, while filled data points indicate statistically 
significant differences from the reference category (birth order 1).  
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Table 1. First Choice of Tertiary Program, with and without control for upper-secondary GPA. 
 Teacher long 
Teacher short 
A
rts 
H
um
anities 
Social and behavioral 
sci. 
Journalism
 and 
inform
ation 
B
usiness  
Law
 
Life sciences, 
environm
ent 
Physics, M
aths, 
Statistics 
C
om
puting 
Long  engineering 
Short Engineering 
Professions, health 
related 
Short health 
Social services 
  Security 
No GPA control                  
Female 0.036*** 0.012*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.000 -0.019*** 0.021*** 0.012*** -0.003*** -0.047*** -0.144*** -0.106*** 0.041*** 0.112*** 0.056*** -0.004*** 
Birth order: 2 0.012*** 0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.002 0.008** 0.018*** -0.008** -0.006** -0.002 0.000 -0.037*** -0.001 -0.020*** 0.022*** 0.005 0.001 
Birth order: 3 0.019** 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.020*** 0.026** -0.008 -0.010** -0.003 0.002 -0.058*** -0.004 -0.040*** 0.030*** 0.010 0.000 
Birth order: 4 0.021 0.004 0.009* 0.004 0.010 0.030*** 0.024 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 0.004 -0.067*** -0.015 -0.042*** 0.034* 0.004 -0.001 
Birth order: 5 0.040* 0.007 0.010 0.006 -0.002 0.021 0.034 -0.006 -0.012 -0.011 0.002 -0.052** -0.035* -0.058*** 0.053* 0.003 -0.001 
Birth order: 6 0.040 -0.019 0.035* 0.014 -0.006 0.015 0.066 -0.025 0.000 -0.018 0.030 -0.037 -0.045 -0.043 0.014 -0.020 -0.002 
Birth order (linear) 0.010** 0.002 0.003* 0.001 0.002 0.008*** 0.014*** -0.006* -0.005** -0.002 0.001 -0.031*** -0.002 -0.018*** 0.018*** 0.004 0.000 
# Individuals 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 
# Parent FE 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.022 0.057 0.042 0.007 0.032 0.017 0.003 
Mean of Y 0.093 0.013 0.011 0.019 0.052 0.050 0.162 0.056 0.024 0.010 0.027 0.140 0.075 0.074 0.139 0.052 0.002 
GPA control                  
Female 0.050*** 0.016*** 0.002* 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.004* -0.019*** 0.011*** 0.013*** -0.003*** -0.042*** -0.168*** -0.100*** 0.024*** 0.124*** 0.063*** -0.003*** 
Birth order: 2 0.007* 0.001 0.003* 0.001 0.002 0.007** 0.018*** -0.004 -0.006** -0.001 -0.002 -0.029*** -0.003 -0.014*** 0.018*** 0.003 0.000 
Birth order: 3 0.011 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.018*** 0.027** -0.002 -0.010** -0.003 -0.001 -0.044*** -0.008 -0.030*** 0.023** 0.006 0.000 
Birth order: 4 0.011 0.002 0.009* 0.003 0.010 0.027*** 0.024 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.050*** -0.019* -0.030** 0.025 0.000 -0.001 
Birth order: 5 0.028 0.004 0.010 0.006 -0.002 0.018 0.035 0.002 -0.012 -0.010 -0.003 -0.032 -0.040* -0.044** 0.043 -0.002 -0.001 
Birth order: 6 0.025 -0.023* 0.035* 0.013 -0.006 0.011 0.067 -0.014 0.000 -0.017 0.024 -0.010 -0.052 -0.024 0.001 -0.027 -0.002 
GPA (z-score) -0.043*** -0.011*** -0.001* -0.001 0 -0.011*** 0.003 0.031*** -0.001 0.002*** -0.016*** 0.077*** -0.021*** 0.052*** -0.038*** -0.020*** -0.001*** 
Birth order (linear) 0.006 0.001 0.003* 0.001 0.002 0.007** 0.015*** -0.003 -0.005** -0.001 -0.001 -0.023*** -0.005 -0.013*** 0.014*** 0.002 0.000 
# Individuals 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 146,107 
# Parent FE 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 69,518 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.027 0.084 0.045 0.029 0.038 0.021 0.003 
Mean of Y 0.093 0.013 0.011 0.019 0.052 0.050 0.162 0.056 0.024 0.010 0.027 0.140 0.075 0.074 0.139 0.052 0.002 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies.  Models are separate linear probability regressions for applications to the described the program (coded 0/1).  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Table 2. Last Admitted Tertiary Program, with and without control for upper-secondary GPA. 
 Teacher long 
Teacher short 
A
rts 
H
um
anities 
Social and behavioral 
sci. 
Journalism
 and 
inform
ation 
B
usiness  
Law
 
Life sciences, 
environm
ent 
Physics, M
aths, 
Statistics 
C
om
puting 
Long  engineering 
Short Engineering 
Professions, health 
related 
Short health 
Social services 
  Security 
No GPA control                  
Female 0.057*** 0.018*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.020*** 0.004* 0.000 0.013*** 0.010*** -0.003** -0.050*** -0.129*** -0.135*** 0.024*** 0.123*** 0.044*** -0.002*** 
Birth order: 2 0.010* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.010** 0.006 0.016** -0.004 -0.009*** 0.001 0.000 -0.028*** -0.005 -0.017*** 0.013** 0.002 0.000 
Birth order: 3 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.021** 0.012* 0.033** -0.005 -0.017*** 0.000 0.004 -0.041*** -0.013 -0.032*** 0.015 0.003 -0.001 
Birth order: 4 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.002 0.035** 0.017 0.035* 0.002 -0.026** 0.003 -0.004 -0.048** -0.020 -0.040*** 0.013 0.009 -0.002 
Birth order: 5 0.035 0.028* 0.008 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.019 0.001 -0.017 0.000 0.006 -0.049* -0.029 -0.051** 0.004 0.008 -0.003 
Birth order: 6 0.077 0.019 0.013 0.005 -0.013 0.060 0.050 0.044 -0.020 -0.027 0.028 -0.070 -0.067 -0.047 -0.042 -0.006 -0.002 
Birth order (linear) 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.009** 0.006* 0.015** -0.002 -0.008*** 0.001 0.000 -0.023*** -0.006 -0.016*** 0.009* 0.002 0.000 
# Individuals 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 
# Parent FE 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.022 0.046 0.052 0.005 0.037 0.015 0.002 
Mean of Y 0.111 0.018 0.006 0.020 0.061 0.042 0.168 0.036 0.026 0.014 0.033 0.141 0.106 0.050 0.130 0.037 0.001 
GPA control                  
Female 0.075*** 0.022*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.007*** -0.003 0.004** 0.012*** -0.003** -0.045*** -0.154*** -0.129*** 0.011*** 0.131*** 0.044*** -0.002*** 
Birth order: 2 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.009* 0.005 0.017*** -0.001 -0.010*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.019*** -0.007 -0.013*** 0.011* 0.002 0.000 
Birth order: 3 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.020** 0.010 0.035*** -0.001 -0.017*** 0.001 0.000 -0.027** -0.016 -0.025*** 0.011 0.003 -0.001 
Birth order: 4 -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.034** 0.016 0.038* 0.008 -0.026*** 0.003 -0.008 -0.031* -0.024 -0.031** 0.008 0.009 -0.002 
Birth order: 5 0.021 0.025 0.008 0.012 0.014 0.009 0.022 0.007 -0.018 0.000 0.002 -0.030 -0.034 -0.040** -0.002 0.007 -0.003 
Birth order: 6 0.059 0.015 0.012 0.003 -0.015 0.057 0.053 0.052 -0.021 -0.027 0.023 -0.046 -0.073 -0.035 -0.050 -0.007 -0.003 
GPA (z-score) -0.063*** -0.015*** -0.001* -0.005*** -0.005** -0.010*** 0.011*** 0.028*** -0.004*** 0.001 -0.019*** 0.086*** -0.020*** 0.045*** -0.025*** -0.001 -0.001** 
Birth order (linear) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.009** 0.005 0.016** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.016*** -0.008 -0.012*** 0.007 0.002 0.000 
# Individuals 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 94,825 
# Parent FE 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 45,471 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.013 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.013 0.003 0.000 0.027 0.078 0.054 0.027 0.039 0.015 0.002 
Mean of Y 0.111 0.018 0.006 0.020 0.061 0.042 0.168 0.036 0.026 0.014 0.033 0.141 0.106 0.050 0.130 0.037 0.001 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies.  Models are separate linear probability regressions for applications to the described the program (coded 0/1).  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. First Choice of Tertiary Program by Social Class (EGP) with upper-secondary GPA control. 
 Teacher long 
Teacher short 
A
rts 
H
um
anities 
Social and behavioral 
sci. 
Journalism
 and 
inform
ation 
B
usiness  
Law
 
Life sciences, 
environm
ent 
Physics, M
aths, 
Statistics 
C
om
puting 
Long  engineering 
Short Engineering 
Professions, health 
related 
Short health 
Social services 
  Security 
High EGP                  
Female 0.042*** 0.011*** 0.003* 0.009*** 0.023*** 0.008*** -0.016*** 0.012*** 0.013*** -0.003** -0.036*** -0.182*** -0.078*** 0.030*** 0.114*** 0.053*** -0.003*** 
Birth order: 2 0.008* 0.001 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.009** 0.018** -0.004 -0.006** -0.001 -0.002 -0.029*** -0.003 -0.015*** 0.017*** 0.003 0.000 
Birth order: 3 0.012 0.002 0.008* 0.003 0.005 0.022*** 0.027* -0.006 -0.011* -0.003 -0.006 -0.048*** -0.007 -0.032*** 0.027** 0.009 -0.001 
Birth order: 4 0.005 -0.001 0.013* 0.010 0.010 0.032** 0.017 -0.003 -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 -0.051** -0.011 -0.032* 0.020 0.013 -0.002 
Birth order: 5 0.006 0.001 0.010 0.011 -0.003 0.023 0.064* 0.002 -0.013 -0.008 -0.008 -0.025 -0.042 -0.057* 0.023 0.019 -0.001 
Birth order: 6 0.019 -0.011 0.066 -0.017 -0.027 -0.009 0.121* -0.024 -0.007 -0.019 0.007 -0.048 -0.041 -0.019 0.041 -0.030 -0.003 
GPA (z-score) -0.043*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.002 0 -0.013*** -0.001 0.030*** -0.003** 0.002*** -0.016*** 0.087*** -0.023*** 0.056*** -0.044*** -0.020*** -0.001*** 
Birth order (linear) 0.006 0.001 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.009** 0.015** -0.003 -0.005* -0.001 -0.003 -0.025*** -0.003 -0.015*** 0.014** 0.004 0.000 
# Individuals 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 
# Parent FE 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.024 0.088 0.036 0.031 0.040 0.021 0.003 
Mean of Y 0.078 0.009 0.012 0.020 0.055 0.049 0.172 0.063 0.023 0.012 0.026 0.167 0.068 0.086 0.119 0.040 0.002 
Low EGP                  
Female 0.063*** 0.022*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.018*** -0.006 -0.024*** 0.009** 0.014*** -0.005** -0.056*** -0.148*** -0.133*** 0.016*** 0.142*** 0.081*** -0.003*** 
Birth order: 2 -0.001 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.016* -0.010* -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.023*** -0.005 -0.010* 0.021** 0.005 0.000 
Birth order: 3 -0.005 0.008 -0.003 -0.003 0.013 0.010 0.028* -0.004 -0.011 0.000 0.006 -0.031** -0.009 -0.028** 0.023 0.004 0.001 
Birth order: 4 -0.001 0.012 -0.004 -0.001 0.015 0.018 0.031 -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 0.009 -0.036* -0.038* -0.022 0.036 -0.002 0.001 
Birth order: 5 0.031 0.013 0.001 -0.004 0.009 -0.002 0.027 -0.003 -0.011 -0.012 -0.001 -0.026 -0.046 -0.031 0.060 -0.004 -0.001 
Birth order: 6 0.013 -0.018 0.014 0.023 0.025 0.014 0.050 -0.039 0.000 -0.027 0.033 0.028 -0.046 -0.009 -0.033 -0.027 -0.002 
GPA (z-score) -0.045*** -0.015*** -0.002* 0 0 -0.005* 0.007* 0.033*** 0.001 0.002* -0.017*** 0.060*** -0.015*** 0.047*** -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.001 
Birth order (linear) 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.013* -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.016** -0.007 -0.010* 0.015* 0.002 0.000 
# Individuals 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 
# Parent FE 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.012 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.017 0.003 0.002 0.036 0.082 0.062 0.029 0.040 0.024 0.003 
Mean of Y 0.119 0.020 0.010 0.018 0.049 0.054 0.141 0.045 0.023 0.009 0.030 0.097 0.084 0.056 0.172 0.072 0.002 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. Models are separate linear probability regressions for applications to the described the program (coded 0/1). * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. Expected outcomes of First Choice of Tertiary Program and Last admitted program 
 First Choice of Tertiary Program Last admitted program 
 
Expected full 
time 
earningsa Earnings riskb 
Expected 
occupational 
prestigec 
Expected 
level of non-
employmentd 
Expected full 
time 
earningsa Earnings riskb 
Expected 
occupational 
prestigec 
Expected 
level of non-
employmentd 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
No GPA control         
Female -0.060*** -0.011*** 0.752*** 0.001 -0.059*** -0.016*** 0.253*** -0.005*** 
Birth order: 2 -0.023*** -0.001 -1.043*** 0.004*** -0.016*** -0.003* -0.875*** -0.001 
Birth order: 3 -0.031*** -0.002 -1.519*** 0.006* -0.018*** -0.006* -1.310*** -0.003 
Birth order: 4 -0.037*** -0.004 -1.859*** 0.008 -0.017** -0.009* -1.445*** -0.007 
Birth order: 5 -0.036*** -0.010* -1.825*** -0.003 -0.023* -0.014 -1.803** -0.011 
Birth order: 6 -0.027 -0.004 -0.946 0.015 0.006 -0.039** -0.417 -0.031 
Birth order (linear) -0.018*** -0.001 -0.850*** 0.003** -0.012*** -0.003* -0.719*** -0.001 
# Individuals 139,490 139,553 139,563 139,616 87,936 88,083 88,100 88,238 
# Parent FE 69,349 69,353 69,353 69,358 42,222 42,292 42,299 42,366 
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.012 0.026 0.023 0.103 0.014 0.029 0.014 
Mean of Y 5.676 0.074 52.951 0.130 5.667 0.087 52.250 0.148 
GPA control         
Female -0.075*** -0.011*** 0.005 0.003*** -0.071*** -0.018*** -0.364*** -0.007*** 
Birth order: 2 -0.017*** -0.001 -0.765*** 0.004** -0.011*** -0.002 -0.653*** 0.000 
Birth order: 3 -0.022*** -0.002 -1.089*** 0.005 -0.012** -0.005 -0.976*** -0.002 
Birth order: 4 -0.027*** -0.003 -1.335*** 0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -1.015** -0.006 
Birth order: 5 -0.023** -0.010* -1.197* -0.004 -0.015 -0.012 -1.364* -0.010 
Birth order: 6 -0.012 -0.003 -0.196 0.013 0.018 -0.036** 0.197 -0.030 
GPA (z-score) 0.048*** 0.001** 2.411*** -0.004*** 0.041*** 0.009*** 2.103*** 0.005*** 
Birth order (linear) -0.013*** -0.001 -0.614*** 0.003* -0.008*** -0.002 -0.531*** -0.001 
# Individuals 139,490 139,553 139,563 139,616 87,936 88,083 88,100 88,238 
# Parent FE 69,349 69,353 69,353 69,358 42,222 42,292 42,299 42,366 
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.012 0.071 0.024 0.150 0.018 0.068 0.015 
Mean of Y 5.676 0.074 52.951 0.130 5.667 0.087 52.250 0.148 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. a in log units b Risk calculated on full earnings distribution (see text for details) c SIOPS is scaled 20-78, d scaled 0/1. The 
expected outcomes are based on highest ranked alternative in the first tertiary choice, and defined for specific program (not the scheme of clustered programs). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
Table 5. Expected outcomes of First Choice of Tertiary Program by Social Class (EGP) 
 Expected earningsa Earnings riskb 
Expected  
occupational prestigec 
Expected level of  
non-employmentd 
 EGP high EGP low EGP high EGP low EGP high EGP low EGP high EGP low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
No GPA control         
Female -0.056*** -0.066*** -0.010*** -0.012*** 0.848*** 0.565*** 0.002* 0.000 
Birth order: 2 -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.001 -0.001 -1.145*** -0.847*** 0.004** 0.003 
Birth order: 3 -0.035*** -0.022*** -0.002 -0.003 -1.807*** -1.092** 0.009** 0.001 
Birth order: 4 -0.039*** -0.029*** -0.003 -0.005 -2.115*** -1.075* 0.013* 0.001 
Birth order: 5 -0.031* -0.029* -0.014* -0.013* -2.409** -0.818 0.000 -0.015 
Birth order: 6 -0.028 -0.006 -0.012 -0.008 -2.632 1.249 0.020 -0.004 
Birth order (linear) -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.001 -0.002 -1.002*** -0.560*** 0.004** 0.001 
# Individuals 84,119 43,121 84,155 43,142 84,159 43,152 84,187 43,169 
# Parent FE 41,798 21,456 41,800 21,457 41,799 21,459 41,801 21,461 
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.105 0.012 0.012 0.028 0.025 0.027 0.016 
Mean of Y 5.691 5.652 0.076 0.071 53.494 52.145 0.131 0.129 
GPA control         
Female -0.072*** -0.079*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 0.012 -0.050 0.004*** 0.000 
Birth order: 2 -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.806*** -0.649*** 0.004* 0.003 
Birth order: 3 -0.024*** -0.015** -0.002 -0.003 -1.265*** -0.767* 0.008* 0.001 
Birth order: 4 -0.026*** -0.023** -0.002 -0.005 -1.433** -0.756 0.011* 0.001 
Birth order: 5 -0.019 -0.016 -0.014* -0.013* -1.793* -0.190 -0.001 -0.016 
Birth order: 6 -0.013 0.006 -0.012 -0.008 -1.838 1.869 0.018 -0.005 
GPA (z-score) 0.051*** 0.042*** 0.001 0.002** 2.621*** 2.048*** -0.005*** -0.002 
Birth order (linear) -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.702*** -0.397* 0.004* 0.001 
# Individuals 84,119 43,121 84,155 43,142 84,159 43,152 84,187 43,169 
# Parent FE 41,798 21,456 41,800 21,457 41,799 21,459 41,801 21,461 
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.154 0.012 0.012 0.077 0.061 0.029 0.016 
Mean of Y 5.691 5.652 0.076 0.071 53.494 52.145 0.131 0.129 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. a in log units, b Risk calculated on full earnings distribution (see text for details), c SIOPS is scaled 20-78, d scaled 0/1. The 
expected outcomes are based on highest ranked alternative in the first tertiary choice. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 6. Choice of Same Degree or Field as Parents 
 First Choice of Tertiary Program Last admitted program 
 
Degree 
Field of 
study, 3 digit 
Field of 
study, 2 digit Degree 
Field of study, 
3 digit 
Field of study, 
2 digit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No GPA control       
Female 0.005*** -0.003 -0.021*** 0.009*** 0.001 -0.019*** 
Birth order: 2 -0.003* -0.006* -0.008* -0.005* -0.008 -0.012* 
Birth order: 3 -0.003 -0.005 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 -0.017 
Birth order: 4 -0.002 -0.006 -0.015 -0.010 -0.009 -0.024 
Birth order: 5 -0.009 -0.009 -0.031 -0.018 -0.017 -0.061* 
Birth order: 6 -0.014 -0.028 -0.040 -0.017 -0.021 -0.057 
Birth order (linear) -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.011 
# Individuals 146,107 146,107 146,107 94,825 94,825 94,825 
# Parent FE 69,518 69,518 69,518 45,471 45,471 45,471 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 
Mean of Y 0.022 0.066 0.177 0.032 0.102 0.268 
GPA control       
Female 0.004*** -0.003 -0.024*** 0.008*** -0.001 -0.023*** 
Birth order: 2 -0.003 -0.006* -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 -0.011 
Birth order: 3 -0.003 -0.005 -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 -0.015 
Birth order: 4 -0.002 -0.006 -0.013 -0.009 -0.008 -0.022 
Birth order: 5 -0.008 -0.008 -0.029 -0.017 -0.015 -0.058 
Birth order: 6 -0.013 -0.028 -0.037 -0.015 -0.019 -0.053 
GPA (z-score) 0.002* 0.001 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.006** 0.014*** 
Birth order (linear) -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.01 
# Individuals 146,107 146,107 146,107 94,825 94,825 94,825 
# Parent FE 69,518 69,518 69,518 45,471 45,471 45,471 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Mean of Y 0.022 0.066 0.177 0.032 0.102 0.268 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7. Mediation of Birth Order Effects on Tertiary Graduates Wages by Field of Study.  
 All EGP high EGP low 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female -0.158*** -0.073*** -0.156*** -0.075*** -0.160*** -0.067*** 
Birth order: 2 -0.023*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.009*** -0.025*** -0.016*** 
Birth order: 3 -0.036*** -0.019*** -0.033*** -0.013** -0.043*** -0.029*** 
Birth order: 4 -0.037*** -0.016** -0.032*** -0.007 -0.048*** -0.032*** 
Birth order: 5 -0.036*** -0.012 -0.037* -0.005 -0.049** -0.030* 
Birth order: 6 -0.003 0.022 0.011 0.04 -0.044 -0.018 
Field of Study (17 categories)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Birth order (linear) -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.017*** -0.006** -0.020*** -0.013*** 
# Individuals 269,004 269,004 162,599 162,599 78,212 78,212 
# Parent FE 130,118 130,118 78,146 78,146 38,339 38,339 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.313 0.144 0.305 0.164 0.335 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. The outcome is monthly wages standardized to full time, as collected from the ‘wage structure’ data as close to age 30 as 
possible, and after tertiary graduation. This data has partial coverage in the private sector for firms with less than 500 employees. Missing values has been imputed based on wage predictions based 
on annual earnings and information on detailed education codes. The correlation between wage predictions and actual wages is .76. All regressions controls for an imputation dummy.  
 
 
  
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Educational Choice Sample.  
 Mean SD min max count 
Female 0.555 (0.497) 0 1 146,107 
Birth order: 1 0.386     
Birth order: 2 0.439 (0.496) 0 1 146,107 
Birth order: 3 0.139 (0.346) 0 1 146,107 
Birth order: 4 0.029 (0.168) 0 1 146,107 
Birth order: 5 0.006 (0.075) 0 1 146,107 
Birth order: 6 0.001 (0.033) 0 1 146,107 
GPA (z-score) 0.500 (0.876) -4.2479 2 146,107 
Expected outcomes, First Choice      
Expected earnings 5.676 (0.149) 4.8507 6 139,490 
Earnings risk 0.074 (0.061) 0 1 139,553 
Expected occupational prestige (SIOPS) 52.951 (8.402) 20 78 139,563 
Expected level of non-employment 0.130 (0.102) 0 1 139,616 
Expected outcomes, Last Admitted Program      
Expected earnings 5.667 (0.138) 4.8507 6 87,936 
Earnings risk 0.087 (0.089) 0 1 88,083 
Expected occupational prestige (SIOPS) 52.250 (7.598) 20 78 88,100 
Expected level of non-employment 0.148 (0.128) 0 1 88,238 
Match with Parents Education in First Choice      
Degree 0.022 (0.146) 0 1 146,107 
Field of study, 3 digit 0.066 (0.247) 0 1 146,107 
Field of study, 2 digit 0.177 (0.381) 0 1 146,107 
Match with Parents Education in First Choice Last admitted program      
Degree 0.032 (0.175) 0 1 94,825 
Field of study, 3 digit 0.102 (0.302) 0 1 94,825 
Field of study, 2 digit 0.268 (0.442) 0 1 94,825 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics for Educational Graduation Sample.  
 Mean SD min max count 
Female 0.585 (0.492) 0 1 280,731 
Birth order: 1 0.400     
Birth order: 2 0.411 (0.492) 0 1 280,731 
Birth order: 3 0.152 (0.358) 0 1 280,731 
Birth order: 4 0.030 (0.171) 0 1 280,731 
Birth order: 5 0.006 (0.074) 0 1 280,731 
Birth order: 6 0.001 (0.035) 0 1 280,731 
Outcomes      
Ln monthly wage  10.114 (0.277) 4.2435 13 269,004 
Graduating from art school 0.009 (0.094) 0 1 280,731 
Graduating with art degree 0.016 (0.124) 0 1 280,731 
  
Table A3. Coding of Choice Scheme with Expected Outcomes.  
Choice scheme 
No. first 
choices in 
sample 
 
 
Admission 
rate 
GPA among 
the last 
admitteda 
Average of 
expected 
earningsb 
Earnings 
riskc 
Average of 
expected 
occupational 
prestiged 
SD of 
expected 
occupational 
prestiged 
Average of 
expected level of 
non-employment 
(0/1) 
Teacher long 13,577 0.168 0.241 5.590 0.012 57.1 8.56 0.022 
Teacher short 1,936 0.180 0.063 5.521 0.044 51.5 5.29 0.146 
Arts 1,637 0.150 0.528 5.484 0.182 44.6 12.11 0.346 
Humanities 2,835 0.213 0.441 5.446 0.182 46.8 13.76 0.388 
Social and behavioral sci. 7,601 0.146 0.518 5.586 0.144 48.8 12.95 0.262 
Journalism and information 7,370 0.142 0.442 5.582 0.094 47.9 11.36 0.210 
Business 23,692 0.142 0.643 5.709 0.091 48.5 10.21 0.150 
Law 8,225 0.106 1.150 5.813 0.057 63.6 11.72 0.090 
Life sciences, environment 3,531 0.173 0.587 5.566 0.122 51.6 13.34 0.243 
Physics, Maths, Statistics 1,532 0.181 0.677 5.585 0.226 52.9 16.52 0.367 
Computing 4,002 0.193 0.056 5.692 0.101 49.4 9.99 0.152 
Long  engineering 20,409 0.174 1.008 5.802 0.087 55.6 11.98 0.124 
Short Engineering 10,895 0.221 0.389 5.724 0.137 50.3 11.30 0.179 
Professions, health related 10,764 0.061 1.387 5.865 0.059 69.6 8.28 0.091 
Short health 20,285 0.118 0.548 5.544 0.061 47.0 7.35 0.137 
Social services 7,531 0.077 0.581 5.563 0.063 49.4 7.94 0.121 
Security 285 0.160 0.317 5.718 0.019 48.3 6.37 0.031 
Total 146,107 0.145 0.604 5.666 0.085 52.2 10.18 0.146 
a GPA is unconditional z-scores within graduation years b Earnings are in log form, truncated to values above 120,000 (see text) and residualized for year, age, gender immigration status, gender 
and presence of children in the household, and the interaction of gender and children, c same as b, but not truncated; risk is measured as variance relative to level of earnings (see text),  d SIOPS-
scores. 
 
  
Table A4. Case selection. 
  
 Admission, born 1982-1990 Graduation, born 1960-87 
No. cases after selection on… No. Individuals  No. Families No. Individuals  No. Families 
Cohort cut  1,219,701 683,740 3,968,192 1,754,225 
Relevant set sizes  (>1 siblings) 577,092 264,266 2,292,647 992,460 
Non-emigrated                568,526 260,479 2,259,276 978,508 
Alive until age 30 561,226 257,458 2,224,415 966,294 
GPA, upper-secondary school 362,383 169,877   
Tertiary program choice file   148,724 70,945   
Tertiary graduation file   284,749 134,046 
Social background (EGP) 147,491 70,399 282,361 132,926 
Remove large set sizes (>6) 146,107 69,853 280,731 132,340 
Note: each step except the first also applies a set size cut so that >1 siblings must remain in the data. Any deviations from the last figure to the estimated model are due to further internal missing 
on outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5. Probability of being in the analytic choice sample by family size and EGP. 
 
Family size  
 EGP 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
I 0.36 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.39 
II 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.25 
IIIa 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.15 
IVab 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.20 
IVcd 0.18 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.22 
VI 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.13 
VII 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.15 
IIIb 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 
Total 0.25 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Note: the data displays the probability that a family is observed with a least two children in the analytic sample. The baseline data consist of data after cuts for birth cohorts, set sizes, early deaths 
and outmigration. The factors that drive the selection is thus whether we observed GPA from upper-secondary school (i.e., if they graduate) and whether or not they apply for tertiary programs 
(with family size constraints re-applied).  
Table A6. First Choice of Tertiary Program by Social Class (EGP). 
 Teacher long 
Teacher short 
A
rts 
H
um
anities 
Social and behavioral 
sci. 
Journalism
 and 
inform
ation 
B
usiness  
Law
 
Life sciences, 
environm
ent 
Physics, M
aths, 
Statistics 
C
om
puting 
Long  engineering 
Short Engineering 
Professions, health 
related 
Short health 
Social services 
Security 
High EGP                  
Female 0.028*** 0.009*** 0.002* 0.009*** 0.023*** 0.004 -0.016*** 0.021*** 0.012*** -0.002* -0.041*** -0.153*** -0.086*** 0.048*** 0.100*** 0.047*** -0.003*** 
Birth order: 2 0.014*** 0.002 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.011*** 0.018** -0.008* -0.006* -0.002 0.000 -0.040*** 0.000 -0.023*** 0.023*** 0.006* 0.000 
Birth order: 3 0.021* 0.004 0.009* 0.004 0.005 0.025*** 0.027* -0.013 -0.010* -0.004 -0.003 -0.067*** -0.002 -0.044*** 0.036*** 0.013* -0.001 
Birth order: 4 0.016 0.001 0.013* 0.010 0.010 0.035** 0.017 -0.010 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.074*** -0.005 -0.047** 0.032 0.018 -0.002 
Birth order: 5 0.017 0.002 0.010 0.012 -0.003 0.026 0.064* -0.005 -0.013 -0.009 -0.004 -0.046 -0.036 -0.071** 0.033 0.023 0.000 
Birth order: 6 0.033 -0.008 0.066 -0.016 -0.027 -0.004 0.121* -0.034 -0.006 -0.020 0.013 -0.076 -0.033 -0.037 0.055 -0.024 -0.002 
Birth order (linear) 0.011** 0.002 0.004** 0.002 0.001 0.011*** 0.015** -0.007 -0.005* -0.002 -0.001 -0.035*** -0.001 -0.021*** 0.019*** 0.006* 0.000 
# Individuals 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 88,198 
# Parent FE 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 41,893 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.019 0.058 0.032 0.009 0.031 0.016 0.003 
Mean of Y 0.078 0.009 0.012 0.020 0.055 0.049 0.172 0.063 0.023 0.012 0.026 0.167 0.068 0.086 0.119 0.040 0.002 
Low EGP                  
Female 0.049*** 0.018*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.018*** -0.007* -0.022*** 0.019*** 0.014*** -0.004** -0.061*** -0.130*** -0.138*** 0.030*** 0.133*** 0.075*** -0.003*** 
Birth order: 2 0.003 0.006* 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.016* -0.013** -0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.029*** -0.004 -0.014** 0.023** 0.007 0.000 
Birth order: 3 0.002 0.011 -0.003 -0.003 0.013 0.011 0.027 -0.009 -0.011 0.000 0.009 -0.040*** -0.007 -0.035*** 0.027 0.008 0.001 
Birth order: 4 0.006 0.014 -0.004 -0.001 0.015 0.019 0.030 -0.013 -0.007 -0.003 0.011 -0.046** -0.036* -0.029 0.041 0.002 0.001 
Birth order: 5 0.045 0.017 0.002 -0.004 0.009 -0.001 0.025 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 0.005 -0.044 -0.041 -0.046 0.069 0.002 0.000 
Birth order: 6 0.028 -0.013 0.015 0.023 0.025 0.015 0.048 -0.050 0.000 -0.028 0.039 0.008 -0.041 -0.025 -0.023 -0.020 -0.002 
Birth order (linear) 0.003 0.005* 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.013* -0.008 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.021*** -0.006 -0.013** 0.017* 0.004 0.000 
# Individuals 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 45,060 
# Parent FE 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 21,514 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.031 0.059 0.061 0.006 0.036 0.021 0.003 
Mean of Y 0.119 0.020 0.010 0.018 0.049 0.054 0.141 0.045 0.023 0.009 0.030 0.097 0.084 0.056 0.172 0.072 0.002 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. Models are separate linear probability regressions for applications to the described the program (coded 0/1). * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
  
Table A7. Birth order effects on art school graduation.  
   Graduating from art school Graduating with art degree 
 
Graduating 
from art school 
Graduating with 
art degree High EGP Low EGP High EGP Low EGP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.005*** 0 
Birth order: 2 0.002** 0.005*** 0.002* 0.002 0.006*** 0.003* 
Birth order: 3 0.003* 0.007*** 0.003 0.002 0.009*** 0.003 
Birth order: 4 0.004 0.009** 0.005 0.004 0.014*** 0.002 
Birth order: 5 0.005 0.012* 0.009 0.005 0.021* 0.006 
Birth order: 6 0.017 0.022** 0.029 0.007 0.026 0.016 
Birth order (linear) 0.002** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.001 0.005*** 0.002 
# Individuals 280,731 280,731 170,502 81,056 170,502 81,056 
# Parent FE 130,608 130,608 78,491 38,450 78,491 38,450 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Mean of Y 0.009 0.016 0.01 0.006 0.018 0.011 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. Source data is graduation register until 2012, cohorts born 1960-1987. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A8. Choice of Same Degree or Field as Parents by Social Class (EGP) 
 First Choice of Tertiary Program Last admitted program 
 Degree Field of study, 3 digit Field of study, 2 digit Degree Field of study, 3 digit Field of study, 2 digit 
 High EGP Low EGP High EGP Low EGP High EGP Low EGP High EGP Low EGP High EGP Low EGP High EGP Low EGP 
No GPA control             
Female 0.006*** 0.004*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.017*** -0.028*** 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.001 0.008 -0.015** -0.028*** 
Birth order: 2 -0.005* -0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.011* -0.002 -0.008* 0.000 -0.005 -0.013 -0.010 -0.018 
Birth order: 3 -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.019 -0.001 -0.014 0.000 -0.007 -0.012 -0.024 -0.013 
Birth order: 4 -0.005 0.001 -0.009 -0.006 -0.029 0.001 -0.017 0.001 -0.008 -0.013 -0.038 -0.017 
Birth order: 5 -0.023 0.001 -0.017 -0.016 -0.069* -0.001 -0.040 0.004 -0.027 -0.021 -0.125** -0.030 
Birth order: 6 -0.040 -0.002 0.001 -0.033 -0.058 -0.011 -0.062* 0.020 0.049 -0.039 -0.103 -0.027 
Birth order (linear) -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.011* -0.001 -0.007* 0.000 -0.004 -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 
# Individuals 88,198 45,060 88,198 45,060 88,198 45,060 59,562 27,536 59,562 27,536 59,562 27,536 
# Parent FE 41,893 21,514 41,893 21,514 41,893 21,514 28,533 13,232 28,533 13,232 28,533 13,232 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Mean of Y 0.033 0.005 0.082 0.040 0.204 0.137 0.045 0.010 0.119 0.072 0.297 0.220 
GPA control             
Female 0.005** 0.005*** -0.004 0.000 -0.021*** -0.030*** 0.008** 0.009*** -0.003 0.007 -0.019*** -0.033*** 
Birth order: 2 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 -0.004 -0.012 -0.008 -0.017 
Birth order: 3 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.017 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.006 -0.011 -0.022 -0.012 
Birth order: 4 -0.004 0.001 -0.008 -0.006 -0.026 0.002 -0.015 0.001 -0.006 -0.013 -0.034 -0.015 
Birth order: 5 -0.022 0.000 -0.016 -0.016 -0.066 0.001 -0.039 0.004 -0.026 -0.020 -0.122* -0.025 
Birth order: 6 -0.039 -0.003 0.002 -0.034 -0.055 -0.008 -0.060 0.020 0.052 -0.038 -0.098 -0.024 
GPA (z-score) 0.004*** -0.001* 0.003 -0.002 0.010*** 0.007* 0.007*** -0.001 0.006* 0.006 0.013*** 0.018*** 
Birth order (linear) -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.001 -0.007 0.000 -0.004 -0.008 -0.01 -0.011 
# Individuals 88,198 45,060 88,198 45,060 88,198 45,060 59,562 27,536 59,562 27,536 59,562 27,536 
# Parent FE 41,893 21,514 41,893 21,514 41,893 21,514 28,533 13,232 28,533 13,232 28,533 13,232 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 
Mean of Y 0.033 0.005 0.082 0.040 0.204 0.137 0.045 0.010 0.119 0.072 0.297 0.220 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A9. Mediation of Birth Order Effects on Tertiary Graduates Wages by Field of Study Measured with High Specificity.  
 All EGP high EGP low 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female -0.158*** -0.057*** -0.156*** -0.057*** -0.160*** -0.056*** 
Birth order: 2 -0.023*** -0.008*** -0.021*** -0.006** -0.025*** -0.013*** 
Birth order: 3 -0.036*** -0.015*** -0.033*** -0.009* -0.043*** -0.025*** 
Birth order: 4 -0.037*** -0.011* -0.032*** -0.001 -0.048*** -0.028*** 
Birth order: 5 -0.036*** -0.004 -0.037* 0.005 -0.049** -0.021 
Birth order: 6 -0.003 0.023 0.011 0.041 -0.044 -0.014 
Linearized education valuea  0.830***  0.861***  0.780*** 
Birth order (linear) -0.018*** -0.006*** -0.017*** -0.004 -0.020*** -0.011*** 
# Individuals 269,004 269,004 162,599 162,599 78,212 78,212 
# Parent FE 130,118 130,118 78,146 78,146 38,339 38,339 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.352 0.144 0.345 0.164 0.366 
Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. The outcome is monthly wages standardized to full time, as collected from the ‘wage structure’ data as close to age 30 as 
possible, and after tertiary graduation. This data has partial coverage in the private sector for firms with less than 500 employees. Missing values has been imputed based on wage predictions based 
on annual earnings and information on detailed education codes. The correlation between wage predictions and actual wages is .76. All regressions controls for an imputation dummy. a This is 
measure is the predicted wages for specific levels and fields with high resolution (513 categories), net of birth order and relevant controls (see Björklund and Sundström 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A10. Labor market outcomes in 1990 census. 
 Upper service class occupation (0/1)a Occupational prestige (SIOPS) 
 
All All  All High EGP Low EGP All All  All High EGP Low EGP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Female -0.063*** -0.069*** -0.047*** -0.146*** -0.034*** -1.176*** -1.337*** -2.067*** -1.566*** -1.584*** 
Birth order: 2 -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.014*** -0.049*** -0.021*** -1.300*** -1.294*** -0.596*** -1.421*** -1.132*** 
Birth order: 3 -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.019*** -0.071*** -0.028*** -1.970*** -1.961*** -0.920*** -2.280*** -1.673*** 
Birth order: 4 -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.021*** -0.079*** -0.032*** -2.306*** -2.291*** -1.076*** -2.963*** -1.983*** 
Birth order: 5 -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.024*** -0.095*** -0.033*** -2.613*** -2.589*** -1.233*** -3.541*** -2.294*** 
Birth order: 6 -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.023*** -0.091*** -0.032*** -2.473*** -2.429*** -1.039*** -3.973*** -1.913*** 
Microclass same as any parent 
 
-0.093***  
   
-2.479***  
  Linearized education FE (Up. serv.) 
  
0.895*** 
       Linearized education FE (SIOPS) 
       
0.854*** 
  Birth year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maternal age  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Individuals 948,106 948,106 948,034 211,146 430,846 943,643 943,643 943,571 209,846 429,182 
# Parent FE 402,862 402,862 402,861 93,400 181,174 402,776 402,776 402,775 93,365 181,141 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.023 0.25 0.04 0.007 0.01 0.015 0.233 0.02 0.011 
Mean of Y 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.283 0.078 42.046 42.046 42.046 48.302 39.168 
Note: a Upper service class = EGP I. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
Table A11. Sensitivity analyses  
 Educational choice 
 
Choice of degree category Expected outcomes  Choice of same degree 
or field as parents 
Gender 
F stronger gradient in 
teacher long/short,  
M stronger gradient in long 
engineering 
M negative gradient for 
law, F n.s. gradient 
F negative gradient for 
professions, M n.s. gradient 
Stronger gradient for 
M than F in expected 
earnings and SIOPS 
No gender difference, 
except last admission 
field two digit 
inheritance, where F has 
gradient, not M 
Set size 
The gradient become very 
noisy for larger set sizes 
due to much smaller sample 
Gradients are 
similar, but less 
significant for larger 
set sizes due to much 
smaller sample 
Gradients are noisy 
across set sizes due 
varying sample sizes 
Remove birth year 
No substantial difference  No substantial 
difference 
No substantial 
difference 
Note: ‘gradient’ refers to birth order gradient, M = Male, F = Female. 
